

Nasypany - Male #4

12:30:40

1241 063 Battle Stations

1244 063 scramble

- "If we can find it, we'll intercept it."
- 2BW confirms A/c was 11

* pg. 24 "Possible I+J" (2nd / 175)

pg. 37 59:15,18h 11 rebores C NEEDS

"Third A/c hij headed toward Washington"

pg. 44 "We've got to carpet bomb all of
Afghanistan."

pg. 45 "We're not sure where the others are."
"I's on its way to Washington"

pg. 46 "I just told Tocney I want them
down in 386 + you've got to hold them."

"S~~tiny~~" Langley

(pg. 49) Strategy for Langley (includes 6K)

(P9.53) "We need them to go direct BWI"
 ↳ H to OK

"we're not going to talk him in W386"

□ Who is "PT"?

P9.53 "I'm going to choose that guy" - H to OK

P9.55 "We want Center to maintain primary control."

"We just want them..." at 234.6"

P9.57 "Main, we need to expedite it now."

↳ H to OK ← pass pulser (cancel)!

"NASTY" 1100

1. Nasty states he ordered OTIS direct to NYC or that Z-point. Correct?

(p. 56 Filsor: Mar says OTIS directed to mil. airpace + "while we found out ^{what} was only on.")

2. Take the OTIS flight path data + overlay the FAA traffic routes on it \rightarrow should show it was safer to go that way

pg. 16 MCCOB = Fox

S /

3. "Earler tests" on how to take down large a/c.

- Col. Dichtl req. N to run some sims (models) in the tech shop here

95-97

Intercept mission TD

4. Log. Scramble: N states their explanation was for him to head North.

* JF says we can't
I Andy card.

- OTS M. 1.2

"as fast as we could"

- Did DDO know about UA175 was HJ?

- Monta + Monte Belby

:50 mi out; MB says he's/they're watching it

- Mo says how "he's coming towards you"

↳ 13 ht before Danielle O'Brien

- Martzow on ATCC "everyone on that call"

↳ except for FAA!

- Delta 3 portrayed as before 93
crashes (actually ~1100)

- Potus heads North - if they
really knew about 93 would
you fly towards D.C.

- Dozens of fighters?

- Report from FAA that F17 93 fired
off transponder, turned + headed towards
D.C.

- SecDef we rapidly employed NOE

- Just before 1000 am, fighters swarm the air above D.C.

-

□ Cheney's lot?

All 93!

- Rose

- PEOR update on 93

- Montague "The decision was made right there to intercept 93"
 ↳ they did not know!

- VP talkin about tough decision

- C. Rose - POTUS did make the decision to shoot down a/c approaching --
 ↳ POTUS accepted VP's call

! 1017 ATCC → 14 min after
 1031 reported to floor of NADDS that
 VP given order

Mars:

- I got the call from Arnold "take
this off in the air..."
- Mars orders ^{his} Air controllers
to "tell" his pilots
to shoot down intercept 93".
And we
- "That of course passed that along
to the pilots UA 93 will
not be allowed to reach Washington
D.C."
- Selfridge and many members
↳ Mars "we ~~had~~ need you to
intercept flight 93"
- Marquie: We started receiving reports
of the fighters were heading
to intercept, the FAA kept
us informed of their the
estimates as it gets closer
and closer.
- Mars: MCC asks what are we
going to do "get them up
near the cockpit and try to get

"As a military man there are times when you have to make the sacrifice you have to make."

- Mart. says around 1006 "it was the fighters that reported that 93 was down"

"America's Air defense forces were blind."

"Asked to track a boat they could not see"

"How to back up New York City"

→ miss

• "He is right on by Cleveland + I'm afraid he's going to just spiral his plane down to Cleveland"

"Our radars in the military look outward, not inward."

- "Scramble to a
- "our radars are primarily set for out over water" \rightarrow long range
- 925 OWS caps over NYC
 \hookrightarrow about the time we set here the second tour was hit
- Saw/watched 1989
 \hookrightarrow got

Clean the Skys:

9
KEVIN NASYPANY

1/22/04 Interview w/ Col. Nasypany

N. KARA

L. SHAFFER

J. FARMER

G. BROWN

E. DAVIES

He can talk to CONR from
MCC position on a "2 digit"
hotline.

9/11 - he talked to SADT
at CONR

↓
Sgt NOO

Sgt "Air & Technician"

He did not talk to NORAD/
CMOC on 9/11/01

He had access to that info.
in MCC Area.

AST

SD

ID

WD-1

WD-2

Channels / Positions he
was plugged into at
various times on 9/11.

2 hot info he monitored from MCC
position on 9/11 → CONR → MCC could read smoke entries
② AWC - "Air Warning Center" at

- Air Threat CC - would have been monitored, if at all, from Battle Lab.
- MCC - had access to DSN lines (had line phones).
- Nosypony rec'd NSN award for his performance on 9/11/01
- NEADS rec'd award for 9/11 performance
- Nosypony and Col. Cleveland nominated: ~~me too~~ I submitted for awards for performance on 9/11/01
- And Major Jamie Anderson,
Augers
- Sgt. Steve Richmond

Mc Gregor Navy Pier

31 Dec 92

93-

NEEDS

Nov 22 94

650



short

Chandler 96



Algoma 2001

TPA
Track
Proleterian
Area

fox or 2d Bullell
get them over
to Vermilion Narrows

Fox summary

Bad Pup
may be
Mama 85
References

Did not recall
Bajulka

2 18 Cont

Intercept & Downed 2:48:29

Lead longer with? is Huck

4826

QWT 26 Flying to HUNTERS

QWT 25 Talking to 205

10:10 Building just fell

26 27 28
27 28 25 is here

our radars are picking right now

we cannot hear

If we can't control we'll get
nothing

Huntress down for unk 2's at 2412

Prob was DC didn't have
the squeaks

Wash was reporting our guys
flying around

2014 enters operation

3:03:53 First Fighter Wing Confusion

Calls Pope Charles
re First Coles
for on route DC

no 23
no shoulder

13

Confusion on the First

4860 Tankers orbiting

Talking to Cape Charles - we have
this??

4893

Tanker Talk Team 23, 24
end up w 9 birds

4908 Tanker stuff

4928

4942

5011 More confusion on the Firsts

misses ID by type & tail

↓ it was A Andrea
f ?? off of Andreea

CONFIRM FIRST FORCE FORTY

w 20c Cape Charles

No departures off of Langley

Hey just broadcasting that
because nobody knows anything
about it 3:34:22

5000

5024

Stopped Listening

1/23 N.P. Cont

Distribution between
VP Director & ROE change

To show ~~graph~~ no distribution

INTERVIEW: Lt. Col. Nasypyany "Nasty"

- Active duty until 1992. ANG 1993, NEADS since November 1994
- Originally a WD "Weaps Control"
- WD Instructor qualified
- MCC for A-flight beginning of 2001.
- Was never an SD.
- Flight Commander = in charge of 40 officers and enlisted. Similar to a department. MCC duty is separate from Flight Commander duties.
- Any effect of VG-01-2? "actually increased our manning that day."
- "VG-01-02 was supposed to start that morning. A transition to wartime scenario."
- Exercise Director for VG-01-02 was ???
- MCCT was McCain, Bianchi, and Perry.
- Notes are typically taken during events, in addition to logs. Does remember gathering up all of the information following the 9/11 attacks, to be turned into the Battle Cab. Doesn't recall who the POC for the notes in the B Cab was.
- Secure phone to the Battle Cab existed at the MCC – dial a 2-digit number to make it ring to the Battle Cab. Also was able to walk up to the BC to speak to him.
- Also communicated with LtCol. Daniels and Lt.Col. Deskins.
- Also red switch existed from MCC desk to CONR. Rang at the Air Defense Technician (ADT/SADT).
- Could not communicate with CMOC.
- MCC did have a "chat log" – actually 2: 1 MCC and 1 MCCT
- N points out several other chat logs.
- N was monitoring AST,SD,ID, TT, TT, WD.
- Fair to say that he as MCC had "total situation awareness" of the situation.
- CONR chat log and AWC (NORAD Air Warning Center) chat logs were definitely monitored by the MCC. Was allowed to enter data on only the CONR chat log (sometimes called the "Ops Chat Log." MCC/MCCT monitored the chat logs, as well as Maj. Ovens (Canadian).
- "Situation awareness was outstanding."
- All participants review all of the Chat Logs that the NC has.
- N points out that one of the chat logs was an "exercise chat log." N agrees that real-world events were in fact entered into the "exercise chat log." Also, some data may have been entered post-9/11 (RADES data...)
- FAA comms at MCC was through the ID or WD.
- 2 FAA telecom bridges (1 WOC and 1 Herndon CC): "MCC could have connected into those if he wanted, I did not. The Battle Cab also can do that."
- N didn't participate nor monitor the Air Threat Conference Call.
- "The crew performed outstanding on 9/11. Individuals from throughout the unit did receive awards." N received a Meritorious Service Medal (MSM). N personally wrote awards for McCain, Dooley, Fox (via another Crew Commander), Anderson, Richmond, Ayers (ICT), Armitage (ICT), Citino, and Hedrick.

- Any after action review of "A flight" after the events of 9/11. "No, but we did talk as a group and I talked to the staff a few days later."
- Any formal or informal attempt to memorialize the thoughts of the participants? "I don't remember any, no."

John A. focus on the events of 9/11:

- Initially did think that the events were possibly part of the exercise. Was out, and didn't actually hear the initial call come into the floor. (was covered by Lt. Col. Deskins.)
- N has reviewed the "wav" files since 9/11.
- First call comes in. Otis is ordered to b. stations. Otis then scrambled. What was your thought process was at that time. "Looking to put the fighters in the NY area as soon as possible. The FAA put them into W105. My thought process was to get the a/c from Otis to NY City as fast as possible."
- Last known posit of AA11 Z-point was entered into the radar system and MCC instructed techs to look in that area (out 25 miles) for AA11 – called a TPA Track Production Area. "We took the lat-long provided to us by the FAA as the last known position of AA11."
- Who determines scramble order details? "SD takes care of the details. My order was to get them over NY City. If I saw a problem with where they were being sent I'd step in and correct it."
- Miles Kara points out that the Z-point is located in an area that wasn't where the a/c actually went.
- N believes that both he and McCain saw AA11 just before impact, they were looking at the same scope. It was a primary only and may not have been the actual hit on AA11.
- "Every other HJ in the world, they don't run into things." Was the response to JZ going over some of the immediate actions upon NEADS being notified of AA11 (ie. Orders to look for search tracks around the Z-point, etc.)
- Tape played where N orders to fighters go to the JFK area as it "looks like this guy (AA11) hit the Trade Center." No thoughts to call off the scramble, were going to continue down towards NY City.
- N identifies Fox as the voice who lays out the detailed first instructions for the Otis a/c. (MCC OP, Ch. 2 / approx. 22 minutes into tape ~ 0852.)
- 9/18/04 NORAD press release time "0843 FAA notifies NEADS" proven and validated by N to be false.
- N confirms that the UA175 notification comes into NEADS simultaneously with notification of a second WTC hit.
- N confirms that info coming into the IDs, he was IMMEDIATELY fed the info. "There were no time delays or lags on info coming in – milliseconds."
- N confirms that after the UA175 hit, he tells Major Fox that they need to get Otis "over Manhattan" so "at least we've got some kind of play." N agrees that this is a change in strategy from the hold pattern that Otis was just beginning in W-105. This however, takes some time and N is heard to say that "I don't like them there," and "I want those fighters closer in" (on Miles slide presentation).

- Bellucio calls ZNY and says he's having a "difficult time" getting Otis fighters over Manhattan.
<Note the above call and some conversations following it are not on the Alderson transcript, only on the original transcript. They are clear communications.>
- N mentions in these conversations that "if we scramble L" he'll "stick them just south to do a backup as well." -- N confirms that he meant to stick them up in the New York City area.
- Note: from around 9:10 forward on the Alderson MCC OP Ch. 2 – the times must be redone and verified.
- Langley battle stations: N confirms that the decision to scramble Langley came from the Battle Cab (either FO or BC) – N is heard on the tape as being on the phone with the Battle Cab and then immediately instructing the battle stations.
- N confirms that L battle stations was to "lean forward" in case of any emerging threats – and based solely on the events that have occurred in New York City.
- Rebirth: N confirms that the info on AA11 still being airborne and headed to Washington comes to him from the IDs. "I think we need to scramble L right now – and I'm going to take the fighters from Otis and try to chase this guy down if I can find him." ... "OK, Foxy, scramble L head him towards Washington"
- N explains that he was trying to establish a "barrier region" between the reported HJ and Washington DC. He has Otis north to either stay or chase, and Langley headed that way.
- [REDACTED] Except for the one request by Col. Diehl, N never developed tactics to explicitly shoot down Commercial Air targets. But he stated, "Yes, we have done exercises and scenarios as such. And you do know that I was in our exercise shop as well." [REDACTED] N direct reference to question from Miles on whether or not he's ever developed tactics to respond to a/c being used as a weapon.
- Langley Scramble: N says that it was certainly his expectation that Norfolk Approach and Giant Killer would have listened to the scramble order from Huntress and controlled the a/c accordingly.
- N says that Huntress wasn't technically "in control" of the a/c, and that the only way for them to have been from the start would be to initiate AFIO.
- We note that Huck was running both the Langley scramble and coordinating tankers in that area.
- N confirms that the first notification of AA77 that came in to the ID section of the floor was from ZDC, and that it didn't include a position or what direction it was heading – a key point because the IDs correlate that info to the reported third unknown a/c
- N not sure, but believes that the Battle Cab approves AFIO and that the order was given in response to the report of an unknown a/c "6 miles east of the White House." The report came from the TT section, as a result of a TDA that N ordered for the DC area.
- N recalls telling his SD to get Langley to go "super" – right when he makes the comment that he doesn't care how many windows they break.
- B089: First report comes in, MCC OP Ch. 2 page 26. Langley fighters still 112 miles away from CAP point set for over D.C.

- N confirms that calls begin for assistance from other air units, such as Toledo and Selfridge, and these calls are made in reference to B089.
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